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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: This study aims to: (1) explore major and potential challenges facing healthcare facilities operation specifically 
those related to utility supplies; and (2) quantify the impact of utility supplies interruption on the operation of healthcare 
facilities through the development of an estimation model. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: A pluralistic qualitative and quantitative research approach benefiting from an online 
computer program that applies the Discriminant Function Analysis approach. Information was collected from 66 
hospitals following three major earthquakes that struck north-east Japan in 2003. 
 
Findings: Analysis demonstrated that healthcare utilities face three major challenges: vulnerability of infrastructure to 
natural hazards, low performance of alternative sources; and lack of consideration of healthcare utility supplies in 
resilience codes and legislations. The study also proposed a method to estimate the impact of utility interruption of 
healthcare facilities. A model has been developed for the case study hospitals in Northern Japan following three major 
earthquakes in 2003.  
 
Practical implications: The findings are expected to raise the awareness of the critical role utilities play for the operation 
of healthcare facilities which will potentially lead to upgrading resilience codes and legislations. The findings are also 
expected to pool the literature with more information about the resilience of healthcare utility publications. 
 
Originality/value: The topic and issues discussed in this research are original based on authors’ investigations following 
three major earthquakes that took place in north-east Japan. The study followed a statistical approach in addressing the 
inter-relationship between the utility systems post disasters to develop an innovative unique index to predict the impact of 
utility shortage on healthcare. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Recent publications suggest an increase in the number of natural hazards (www.emdat.be) and 
their associated disruptions (Michel-Kerjan, 2011). Earthquakes, floods, landslides, typhoons 
and other hazards affect many countries and regions around the world. However, the impact 
tends to be more significant in countries where there is lack of preparedness, large populations 
and fragile infrastructure, including healthcare. This has encouraged international 
organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) to organise campaigns and events, 
such as ‘Hospitals Safe from Disasters’ global campaign (2008-2009), with the aim to raise 
awareness and attract attention to protect healthcare facilities from natural hazards. The 
campaign has been followed by ‘Resilient Cities’ (2010-2015) aiming to improve the resilience 
(i.e. robustness, strength and ability to recover from disruptions) of city systems as part of 
sustainable development.  
 
Healthcare facilities are one of the most complicated and critical facilities in any country. They 
are a key provider of health services as they monitor the wellbeing of society and prevent 
potential outbreaks. They also play an important role in the local economy, as people from 
 
 
different disciplines, backgrounds and abilities are required to administrate. In addition various 
suppliers, businesses, transport networks (both public and private) are necessary to connect it 
with external systems. Hospitals are also of particular importance as they are central to dealing 
with the large number of injuries typically associated with large-scale disasters (Achour and 
Price, 2010). Healthcare facilities are a combination of two main factors, physical and social. 
The physical factor  was  referred to in the Pan America Health Organization (PAHO, 2000) 
classification as ‘structural’ and ‘non-structural’ components. It includes elements such as 
beams, columns, equipment and utilities. The social factor is often referred to as ‘functional’ or 
‘operational’ components such as human resources, planning and management processes. In 
this study, a similar classification has been adopted with slight modification: architectural 
elements (e.g. doors, windows and separation walls) will be considered as part of the structural 
category instead of the non-structural category and will be referred to in this paper as 
‘structural and architectural’ components. The non-structural category will include mechanical 
and electrical systems such as utilities and equipment and will be referred to as ‘critical 
systems and equipment’. 
 
1.1 Need for more utility resilience research 
There has been a substantial amount of work conducted in the field of healthcare resilience. 
However, most of it has been dedicated to structural and functional performance. A major 
proportion of this work has been allocated to reporting the cause of structural damage and 
fragility such as in Mehani et al. (2011) and Wilkinson et al. (2012), and upgrading structural 
performance such as in Nuti and Vanzi (1998). Considerable effort has also been directed 
towards crisis management (Mostafa et al., 2004), staff attendance in disasters 
(Senpinar-Brunner et al., 2009), preventive strategies (Peek-Asa et al., 1998), risks and 
opportunities evaluation (Loosemore et al., 2011), logistic management during disasters 
(VanVactor, 2011) and capacity improvement (Ukai, 1996). In recent years, the frequency of 
utility resilience publications seems to be increasing. For example, in recent publications, 
Myrtle et al. (2005) classified non-structural systems in hospitals following a combination of 
system and empirical approaches, and Hiete et al. (2011) investigated the impact of power 
outage on hospitals in Germany using a qualitative and empirical research approach. Although, 
this is a good indication that the resilience of hospital utility system is being the focus of many 
researchers, more research is needed to pool the literature resources with more information that 
will enhance the resilience of healthcare utility systems specifically in terms of: identifying 
challenges facing healthcare utilities, and the impact utility’s interruption could have on the 
continuity of healthcare.  
 
The impact of utility failure is relatively comparable to structural failure in terms of the 
continuity of healthcare service due to external and, or internal utility system damage. The 
Applied Technology Council (ATC, 2008) recognised this problem stating that the lack of 
protection of building contents in resilience codes can pose an additional risk to safety and 
continuity of operations after disasters. There is a significant number of case studies showing 
the impact of utility failure, which varied between inoperability of medical services and 
coordination with outside (Kirsch et al., 2010, DH, 2008, Peters, 1996) and evacuation of 
hospital buildings (Italie and Marchione, 2012, Shinozuka et al., 1995).  More case study 
problems experienced in hospitals due to interruption of utility supplies have been presented in 
Table 1. These problems have motivated organisations such as the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (www.fema.gov) and Geohazards International (www.geohaz.org) to 
produce guiding documents (e.g. Design Guide for Improving Hospital Safety in Earthquakes, 
Floods and High Winds (FEMA, 2007) and Reducing Earthquake Risk in Hospitals from 
 
 
Equipment, Contents, Architectural Elements and Building Utility Systems (Rodgers et al., 
2009)) to help reduce risks associated with the failure of utilities. Hence, it is important to 
better understand these vital components and how they affect the continuity of medical 
services. This study is a continuation of the analysis started in Achour et al. (2011), which 
focused on structural performance. It aims to: (1) explore major and potential challenges facing 
healthcare facilities operation specifically those related to utility supplies; and (2) quantify the 
impact of utility supplies interruption on the operation of healthcare facilities through the 
development of an estimation model. 
 
Table 1: Sample of utility failure impact on hospitals 
Hospital Hazard Problem Consequence Source 
NYU Hospital Hurricane Loss of electric power Evacuation of 200 
patients 
(Italie and 
Marchione, 2012) 
Group of hospitals 
in Chile 
Earthquake Loss of power and insufficiency 
of backup power; interruption of 
telecommunication systems; 
loss of municipal water  
Inoperability of medical 
services, coordination 
with the outside   
(Kirsch et al., 
2010) 
Gloucestershire 
Hospital (UK) 
Flood 
 
 
Water contamination Inoperability of medical 
services and cease of 
activities 
(DH, 2008) 
 
 
Christian and 
Shiu-Tuan 
hospitals 
Earthquake Damage to fuel system Blackout (Lee and Loh, 
2000) 
Kobe University 
Medical College 
(Japan) 
Earthquake Damage to high raised water 
tank 
Flooding, Blackout and 
evacuation of the 
facility 
(Shinozuka et al., 
1995) 
Group of hospitals 
in Iowa (USA)  
Flood Water loss Nearly all phases of 
patient care and facility 
operation were affected 
(Peters, 1996) 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW: CHALLENGES FACING UTILITY SUPPLIES 
2.1 Increasing hazards and critical infrastructure vulnerability 
Recent research outcomes suggest that the number of natural hazards, both environmental and 
geo-physical, will increase due to the effect of global warming (Sauber and Ruppert, 2008, 
Hetzel and Hampel, 2006). Although, the connection between geo-physical hazards and global 
warming is still debatable, there is an urgent need to improve the resilience of healthcare 
infrastructure to cope with environmental, geological and hydrometeorological hazards as they 
have increased over 20 fold since the 1940s (www.emdat.be) and have the potential to cause 
complex disasters that occur simultaneously or separately. Over the last few years, there were 
several highly disruptive natural events that demonstrate the complexity and diversity of 
impact associated with natural hazards. Disasters “are not always singular or isolated 
events…they can occur in complex combinations and, or rapid succession” (EEA, 2003), as 
demonstrated by the experience of many countries such as China in 2008 where the Sichuan 
Earthquake was followed by floods and landslides magnifying the amount of disruption caused 
by the earthquake. 
 
Infrastructure failures can be driven by the intensity of disasters or also by vulnerability. Many 
countries’ infrastructure vulnerability is due to lack of expenditure, and/or the increasing 
number and severity of climate change driven natural hazards. For example, the World 
 
 
Economic Forum’s annual Global Competitiveness Report ranked the United Kingdom (UK) 
“mid-table compared to the rest of the world in terms of its basic infrastructure networks” 
(Orr, 2010) and the Institution of Civil Engineers’ (ICE) State of the Nation: Infrastructure 
report (ICE, 2010) highlighted “significant deficiencies in these critical national assets”, in 
part resulting from lack of integration and collaboration between sectors, decreasing resilience, 
lack of sustainability, impact of significant cuts and failure to take account of future needs. In 
winter, the UK consumes approximately 60 gigawatts of electric power, most of which are 
generated by 30 large power stations (ICE, 2010). Many of these power stations are located in 
vulnerable areas such as the Dungeness power plant, which is built few meters above sea level 
on an “unstable geological formation” (Paskal, 2009), and the hundreds of power substations 
and water treatment plants that have been built in floodplain areas (BBC, 2008). Some of this 
infrastructure has been very close to failure during recent events: for example, the Ulley 
reservoir (built in 1871) and the Walham substation during the 2007 summer floods. 
 
2.2 Low performance of backups 
International organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and PAHO 
recommended that healthcare facilities have alternative suppliers and duplicate items to 
provide a certain level of independence from external supply networks (PAHO, 2000). 
Consequently, many hospitals have been equipped with alternative supply systems, which 
increased their resilience and secured the continuity of healthcare. There are many alternative 
sources, but most used are Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) systems and power generators. 
UPS systems have been used in many facilities around the world (e.g. in Milton Keynes 
General Hospital in the UK and Matto Public Hospital in Japan). They are charged with 
commercial power or fuel power generators (Shinozuka et al., 1995); however, experience has 
demonstrated that commercial power automatically shuts down in earthquakes for safety 
reasons (e.g. Tomato-Atsuma power station, Japan) or as a result of network damage which 
underlines the risk of power interruption. The performance of power generators has been a 
major issue in hospitals for many decades: Jones and Mar (1945) stated that generators 
“operating troubles were due largely to unsatisfactory cooling”. The Kobe University Medical 
College and Hyogo Medical Center could not use their power generators for fear of 
overheating as the cooling system depended on water supply which was damaged in both 
facilities following the 1995 Japanese Hyogo Nambu Earthquake - also known as Kobe 
Earthquake (Shinozuka et al., 1995); and the Christian and Shiu-Tuan hospitals lost their 
electric power due to damage to fuel systems (Lee and Loh, 2000).  
 
2.3 Integration in resilience codes and legislations 
Utilities play a considerable role in the continuity of medical services such as supplying 
equipment, guarantee continuity of care, especially in critical areas, maintaining the indoor 
environmental quality, and connecting the facility with the outside. However, this role is 
frequently overlooked in many resilience codes and legislations designed to ensure the 
minimum required performance of the built environment or infrastructural component, where 
the focus is more  on protecting  structural components, as they cause direct threat to human 
life in case of hazards rather than  critical systems such as utilities. A review of five 
international resilience codes, legislations and guidelines (see Table 4) led to the conclusion 
that there is a contrast between countries’ approaches in addressing the resilience of healthcare 
utilities: whilst the EuroCode 8 (European seismic design code), RPA 99 (Algerian seismic 
design code) and Iranian seismic design codes do not seem to pay attention to utilities, 
legislations in the UK and California tend to be more comprehensive. The UK Civil 
Contingency Act 2004 provides a comprehensive and generic set of legislations under which 
 
 
the Health Building Notes – HBNs – (DH, 2007a) and Health Technical Memoranda – HTMs – 
(DH, 2007b) provide a set of suggestions and recommendations to support healthcare facilities 
improving their resilience. Californian authorities, however, developed the Senate Bill (SB) 
1953 specifically for hospitals to highlight the importance of its medical facilities as many of 
them suffered significant damage in previous earthquakes. 
 
Table 4 – Resilience codes, legislations and guidelines 
 
Code/legislation 
 
Structural and 
Architectural components Equipment and Utilities Comments 
SB 1953 (California) 
√ √ Specific for hospitals 
Iranian 3rd Edition 
2007 √ - Generic 
RPA 99 V2003 
(Algeria) √ - Generic 
EuroCode 8 (French 
Edition) √ - Generic 
HBNs and HTMs  
(UK) - √ Specific for hospitals 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research reported in the paper adopted a pluralistic qualitative and quantitative approach. 
Comprehensive literature review, including reconnaissance reports, research papers and 
official documents were reviewed to identify lessons learnt from previous experience and 
challenges facing future healthcare services. The findings were complemented by the findings 
of field investigations (questionnaire survey) to develop a tangible measure for the impact of 
utility failure on the performance of hospitals. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Investigated events epicentres and affected areas  
(affected areas are not to scale) 
 
 
 
The investigations were conducted during December 2003 in the Japanese Tohoku and 
Hokkaido areas where three major earthquakes struck in May, July and September of the same 
year. Figure 1 illustrates the locations of surveys and Table 2 summaries earthquakes’ damage. 
In November 2003, questionnaires were sent, by postal mail, to 120 hospitals. Responders 
where given one month to respond using a stamped-addressed-envelope. Responses were 
received from 66 facilities located in the affected areas. Each responding hospital was assigned 
an identifying code H1 to H66 (Table 3). 
 
Table 2: Characteristics and impact of the events 
 
Earthquake Date Local Time 
Magnitude 
(JMA scale) 
Hypocenter 
(km) Observations 
Miyagi-ken 
Sanriku- Minami 
Earthquake 
26 
May 
2003 
6:24 p.m. M7.0 60 Buildings suffered various levels of damage.  
174 people injured. Health care facilities 
suffered structural and lifeline damage. 
Miyagi-ken 
Hokubu 
Earthquake 
26 Jul 
2003 
7:13 a.m. M6.2 12 11,341 houses and buildings were damaged.  
14,000 families were affected by damage to 
water supply network. 
638 people injured and were treated in 17 
hospitals.  
Two hospitals suffered very severe damage to 
their structure as well as their lifelines. 
Tokachi-Oki 
Earthquake 
26 Sep 
2003 
4:50 a.m. M8.0 40 No deaths ensued but 755 people were injured.  
Damage to lifelines was very evident in the 
form of a widespread blackout. 
 
Table 3: Interruption and performance index of hospitals 
 
Hospital Utility duration of interruption (hours) Performance Index- y Comments x1  x2  x3 x4 x5 x6 Real Calc. Est. Eqe Results 
H2 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.118 0 Hokkaido  
H3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1.238 1 Hokkaido False 
H7 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.149 1 Hokkaido False 
H9 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0 1.993 0 Hokkaido  
H14 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0.378 0 Hokkaido  
H21 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0.208 0 Hokkaido False 
H22 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1.238 1 Miyagi-H False 
H26 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.166 0 Miyagi-S  
H28 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0.251 0 Miyagi-S  
H30 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0.251 0 Miyagi-S  
H36 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.746 0 Miyagi-H  
H37 0 0 0.7 3 3 0 0 1.491 0 Miyagi-S  
H38 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0.050 0 Miyagi-S  
H39 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 1 0.121 0 Miyagi-N/A False 
H41 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0.448 0 Miyagi-H  
H42 0 0 0 8 8 0 0 -0.072 1 Miyagi-H False 
H43 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.099 0 Miyagi-S  
H45 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1.369 0 Miyagi-H  
H53 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1.369 0 Miyagi-N/A  
H54 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 -0.078 1 Miyagi-N/A False 
H57 0 0 0 3 3 0 1 0.050 0 Miyagi-S False 
H61 1.5 0 0 1 1 0 1 -1.943 1 Miyagi-H  
H62 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.166 0 Miyagi-S  
H65 0 10 0 2 2 0 0 1.670 0 Miyagi-S  
Hokkaido: Tokachi-Oki Earthquake, Miyagi-H: Miyagi-ken Hokubu Earthquake,  
Miyagi-S: Miyagi-ken Sanriku-Minami Earthquake; Miyagi-N/A: the response is not provided Miyagi-H or Miyagi-S. 
 
The questionnaire comprised of 45 questions divided into seven sections: Structural Damage, 
Injury to Personnel, Utility Damage, Medical Equipment Damage, Relief Activities, Crisis 
Management and General Information. Questions were designed based on a preliminary site 
 
 
visits and aimed to collect the level of structural damage, stability of equipment, duration of 
utility interruption, impact of damage on healthcare duties, presence of crisis management 
courses and manuals, food and drug supplies. 
 
The 66 responses were screened based on: complete information provided in the response 
sheet; importance of the facility for post-earthquake emergency provision; and level of 
structural damage. Facilities such as dental clinics and those moderately to heavily damaged 
facilities were not considered in this study in order to ensure that utility interruption was not 
caused by structural and/or architectural elements and that facilities inoperability was due 
solely to utility disruptions. Consequently, 24 cases were found suitable for this study, see 
Table 3. 
 
Questionnaire survey data were analysed further according to ‘Theory of Estimation’ using an 
online computer program (Aoki, 2006) that applies the ‘Discriminant Function Analysis’ 
approach to determine which variables discriminate between the two naturally occurring 
groups: unaffected (Group 0) and affected (Group 1). The method involved combining all 
variables, affecting the operation of the facilities, into one mathematical equation to: (1) 
estimate whether healthcare has been affected or unaffected; and (2) classify these variables 
according to their greater impact on the operation of the healthcare facility. 
4 IMPACT OF UTILITY INTERRUPTION ON HEALTHCARE: CASE STUDY  
Findings demonstrate that, despite the limited number of case studies, the collected data is 
important as 45% of the respondents accepted earthquake-related injuries. Findings also 
demonstrated that most hospitals (68%) had sound resilience strategies, including the 
provision of emergency manuals (covering hazards such as fire, earthquakes, floods, snow and 
tsunamis), were supported annually with one to two lectures in 53% of the facilities and 
trainings (in 88%), and were equipped with alternative sources for critical utilities such as 
electricity and water. These measures supported the hospitals to remain operational. However, 
some facilities could not operate properly due to inappropriate equipment: for example, the 
Ishimaki Night Emergency Center (H51) had to halt the X-ray service due to insufficient power 
supply. Respondents highlighted that interdependency between utility systems was a problem 
for continued operation: the Tohoku Koseinenkin Hospital (H29) extracts water from 
boreholes which then has to be filtered electrically before use, the shortage of electric power 
resulted in a lack of water supply. Many hospitals’ staff reported that they had to redial many 
times to get connected which indicates that there were problems with telephone network 
suppliers. Hospitals such as the Fukaya (H27) and Kashimadai (H59), which were eliminated 
from this study, suffered damage to their structures and internal pipeline networks, and 
interruption of commercial power causing patients to be transferred to other facilities. 
 
A total of six utilities were identified for analysis due to their common usage in Japanese 
healthcare facilities. Each of the utilities was illustrated with a mathematical variable (xi), 
namely: electricity (x1), gas supply (x2), water supply (x3), landline telecommunication (x4), 
mobile phone (x5) and Personal Handy-phone System (PHS phone) (x6). Data was divided into 
two groups identified according to the response to the question: ‘Did utility malfunction have 
an impact on your task?’ A ‘Yes’ answer, represented by ‘y=1’, implies the shortage of utility 
affected the hospital operation, and a ‘No’ answer, represented by ‘y=0’, implies the shortage 
of utility did not affect the hospital operation.  
 
 
 
123.027.1043.0067.0059.2163.036.1 654321 +++−++−= xxxxxxy        (1) 
 
Equation 1 was generated in which each variable was weighted automatically, according to the 
Estimation Theory. The equation was used to estimate the effect of utility shortage on 
healthcare by calculating value ‘y’ for each facility. A positive value of y implies unaffected 
healthcare (considered as y=0), whilst a negative value implies affected healthcare (considered 
as y=1). Table 3 illustrates that in 67% of cases, the prediction of functionality agreed with the 
actual facility performance. The cases where estimation was not accurate are marked with 
‘False’ in the ‘Comments’ column of Table 3.  
 
The standardized coefficient of each variable was calculated to identify the most influential 
variable, which has the highest absolute value. According to Table 5, x1 is the most important 
variable (standardized coefficient = 0.534), thus the most important utility for the operation of 
these facilities is electric power. This result concurs with many research findings such as in 
Myrtle et al. (2005) where electrical system was classified as the second most important utility 
after the pipeline system (e.g. gas and water) in hospitals, and in DeDeRHECC (2010) where 
power was classified as the most important due to the impact power shortage could have on 
medical services. 
 
Table 5: Classification of utilities and standardised coefficients 
Degree of importance Variable Utility system Absolute value of standard Coefficient 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
x1 
x6 
x2 
x3 
x4 
x5 
Electricity 
PHS phone 
Gas 
Water 
Tel. Landline 
Mobile phone 
0.534 
0.506 
0.328 
0.288 
0.120 
0.083 
5 DISCUSSION AND DIRECTION OF CRITICAL RESEARCH 
5.1 Need for a comprehensive strategy for healthcare utility resilience: 
One of the major characteristics of healthcare facilities is that they are highly dependent 
systems. They depend on many systems such as critical infrastructure to operate (e.g. electric 
power, water and telecommunication). In order to reduce this dependency and increase 
resilience, many healthcare facilities are equipped with alternative sources, which are expected 
to replace main sources in emergency situations. However, previous experience demonstrates 
that these alternative sources are not always reliable. The challenge is therefore what needs to 
be done to ensure the continuity of utility supplies? The study identified three major directions 
that could potentially reduce the vulnerability of healthcare utility supply if they are adopted in 
a comprehensive strategy for healthcare utility resilience. These are: (1) improving the 
resilience of utility infrastructure to natural hazards; (2) improve performance of alternative 
sources; and (3) ensure that healthcare utility supplies are well covered by resilience codes and 
legislations.  
 
a- Resilience of utility infrastructure:  
The improvement of infrastructure is a major challenge in many countries as this requires 
significant financial resources and recognisable risks. However, the on-going financial crisis 
will make this a major challenge and perhaps will require more efficient and effective 
strategies. On the risk recognition side, countries which historically are classified as ‘safe from 
disasters’, such as the UK, are in need more than ever to improve their infrastructure resilience 
 
 
and ‘expect what is not expected’. The conventional methods of hazard prediction are perhaps 
difficult to accurately predict future natural hazards as they are based on historical data. 
However due to the presumption that these countries are safe from disasters, most of these 
historical data do not necessarily exist. The experience of hazard-exposed-countries such as 
Japan and China thus could be useful in identifying potential scenarios. 
 
b- Performance of alternative resources: 
The study findings point to there being two elements that affect the performance of alternative 
sources: mechanical failure and dependency on critical infrastructure (i.e. main supply). There 
are limited options to avoid mechanical failure these include regular maintenance and testing 
and adoption of less dependent systems such as air-cooled power generators. This indicates the 
need to investigate more reliable and independent techniques. For example, renewable energy 
could be examined further to find out whether the energy delivered could meet with the 
demand of healthcare facilities in emergency times. 
 
c- Integration of utility in resilience codes: 
The contrast between countries in protecting healthcare utility supplies demonstrates that there 
is lack of understanding of the critical role utilities play in the continuity of healthcare in 
emergencies. Authorities need to work harder to develop minimum requirements to protect 
healthcare utilities especially with the increasing risks disasters and potential of more demand 
on healthcare. 
 
5.2 Quantification of the impact of utility supplies interruption on healthcare: 
The approach adopted in quantifying the impact of utilities on healthcare is a major 
contribution of this study and has the potential to be applied to different settings and situations 
(e.g. flood and typhoon). The equation provides an estimation of this impact and enables the 
classification of utility systems according to their effect on the overall impact. The 
identification of electric power being at the forefront of the most influential systems was 
expected due to previous work of Myrtle et al. (2005) and DeDeRHECC (2010) publication. 
However, whilst the latters followed a system and empirical approaches to identify the most 
important utility system, this study followed a statistical approach that complements these 
approaches to introduce a new way to quantify the impact of interruption on healthcare. 
 
5.3 Research limitation: 
During the data analysis process, a few research limitations have been identified. These are 
mainly driven by the limitation of data which affected the final results in terms of applicability 
and accuracy. The equation was developed based on data collected from facilities located in the 
Japanese Tohoku and Hokkaido areas following three major earthquakes. This indicates that, 
in its current form, it is true only for the facilities shown in the study sample. The equation also 
does not take into consideration the existence of, and effect alternative supply sources have on 
the operability of healthcare facilities, which explains its accuracy to be 67%. These limitations 
will be addressed in future research activities.  
6 CONCLUSION 
The importance of healthcare infrastructure lies with the vital service they provide at all times. 
However, their complexity and dependency on external infrastructure make them vulnerable. 
Experience demonstrated that infrastructure have been affected by the increasing number of 
hazards due to the changing climate. In order to reduce this vulnerability many healthcare 
facilities were equipped with alternative sources with the view to provide necessary supplies 
 
 
when needed. However, this also was not always possible as these sources did not perform as 
were expected due to mechanical failure or their dependency on other supplies. This indicates a 
need to investigate more reliable and independent systems such as renewable energy. 
 
Developing the right strategy could be the most significant step toward the resilience of 
healthcare facilities. This strategy is three fold:  
• Improving the resilience of utility infrastructure to natural hazards;  
• Improving performance of alternative sources; and 
• Ensuring that healthcare utility supplies are well covered by resilience codes and 
legislations. 
 
The study proposed a method to quantify the impact of utility supplies’ interruption on the 
continuity of healthcare through the development of an equation, in which each of its variables 
represents a utility. The equation also allows the ranking of utilities according to their ability to 
affect the overall performance of the facility. The equation successfully estimates the 
inoperability of 67% of the study sample. Future research work will focus on improving this 
ratio further and on developing an equation that could be used in a wider setting and situations.  
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